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2 
The Intrinsic Foundations of Extrinsic Motivations and Goals: Towards a 
Unified Humanistic Theory of Wellbeing and Change 
 
Summary 
A key contribution of both classical and contemporary humanistic theories is their 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations and drives, and their 
demonstration that psychological wellbeing is more strongly associated with the 
former than the latter.  However, such a dimensionalization raises the question of how 
extrinsic motivations and goals emerge; and classic humanistic attempts to account for 
this tend to contradict some of the basic tenets of humanistic thinking: that human 
beings are integrated, meaning-seeking agencies consistently striving to maintain and 
enhance their being.  An alternative framework is therefore proposed, a hierarchy of 
wants, in which extrinsic motivations and goals are seen as attempts -- albeit often 
unsuccessful ones -- to reach the highest order, most intrinsic JRDOV+HUH³H[WULQVLF´
motivations and goals are not considered pathogenic, per se, but problematic because 
of their indirectness and lack of fit to present contexts.  This model also suggests that 
human beings are most likely to achieve a state of wellbeing when their goals are 
synergetically related: determined both by the internal configuration of goals and 
external resources. 
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At the heart of humanistic models of personality, development and wellbeing is a 
distinction between intrinsic, authentic, or congruent motivations and goals, and those 
that are considered to be extrinsic to, or incongruent with, a SHUVRQ¶Vauthentic needs 
and experiences.  Rogers (1951, 1959, 1961), for instance, in his classical person-
centered model of personality and development, argues that human beings come into 
the world with an organismic valuing process: an innate tendency to positively value 
experiences which maintain or enhance the organism.  Through the existence of 
conditional positive regard, however, they are seen as coming to introject the values 
of others and act in ways that are no longer self-maintaining or self-enhancing.  
Similarly Fromm (1942, 1961, 1991, 1965b), like other advocates of a humanistic 
psychoanalytic and Marxist perspective (e.g., Marcuse, 1966), argues that human 
beings, within a capitalist socio-economic context, come to develop false and 
synthetic needs; alienated from their genuine human motivations and desires.  
Developing these basic humanistic ideas, contemporary self-determination 
theorists have gone on to postulate a continuum of motivational types, ranging from 
nonself-determined motivations to self-determined motivations (Ryan & Deci, 2000).  
At the most extreme nonself-determined end is amotivation; followed by four 
increasingly self-determined types of extrinsic motivation (external regulation, 
introjected regulation, identified regulation, integrated regulation); with intrinsic 
motivation at the most self-determined end of the spectrum (Ryan & Deci, 2000).  
Most recently, this framework has been extended to the domain of goals through a 
distinction between intrinsic, or self-concordant (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon & 
Houser-Marko, 2001), goals, ³those that are likely to satisfy basic and inherent 
psychological needs´ (Kasser & Ryan, 1996, p. 280) and extrinsic goals, those that 
³primarily entail obtaining contingent external approval and rewards´ (Kasser & 
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Ryan, 1996, p. 280).  Examples of intrinsic goals, as given by Kasser and Ryan 
(2001), are such desires as for self-acceptance, affiliation and community feelings: all 
attempts to directly satisfy such basic psychological needs as relatedness, autonomy 
and personal growth.  By contrast, examples that they give of extrinsic goals are the 
desires for wealth, appearance, and fame: all outcomes that are intended to heighten 
RQH¶VVWDQGLQJLQWKHH\es of others and to earn public admiration.   
 Over the last two decades, a wealth of research has demonstrated the empirical 
validity, and importance, of this intrinsic--extrinsic dimension.  Self-determination 
research, for instance, has shown that people who are intrinsically motivated, 
FRPSDUHGZLWKWKRVHZKRDUHH[WHUQDOO\FRQWUROOHGKDYHPRUH³LQWHUHVWH[FLWHPHQW
DQGFRQILGHQFH´LQWKHLUDFWLRQVOHDGLQJWR³HQKDQFHGSHUIRUPDQFHSHUVLVWHQFHDQG
FUHDWLYLW\´(Ryan & Deci, 2000, p. 69).  Similarly, while the pursuit of intrinsic goals 
is associated with higher levels of psychological wellbeing and greater achievement of 
goals; the pursuit of extrinsic goals is associated with lower wellbeing, lower vitality, 
and more anxiety, depression and physical symptoms (Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996, 
2001; Koestner, Lekes, Powers, & Chicoine, 2002; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999, p. 484; 
Sheldon & Kasser, 1998).  Confirmatory factor analysis has also demonstrated the 
validity of this intrinsic--extrinsic goal dimension across a range of cultures (Grouzet 
et al., 2005).   
 
The aetiology of extrinsic motivations and goals 
Theory and research based on this intrinsic--extrinsic dimension is one of the major 
contributions -- if not the major contribution -- that humanistic psychology has made 
to the wider psychological field (Cooper, O'Hara, Schmid, & Bohart, in press; 
Sheldon & Kasser, 2001).  However, a conceptual question that this 
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dimensionalization raises is that of the aetiology of extrinsic motivations and goals.  
That is, what is our understanding of why people come to act towards goals that are 
alien to their actual, innermost needs and desires; particularly if, from a humanistic 
standpoint, we hold that human beings are actualizing organism with the sole motive 
RIGHYHORSLQJDOOWKHLUFDSDFLWLHV³LQZD\VZKLFKVHUYHWRPDLQWDLQRUHQKDQFHWKH
RUJDQLVP´(Rogers, 1959, p. 196).  
 
Extrinsic motivations as externally-derived 
,Q5RJHUV¶V(1951) earlier work, the existence of extrinsic motivation is attributed to 
the direct introjection of attitudes and perceptions from external figures, in particular 
parents.  Similarly, for Fromm (1942, p. 84), human beings are seen as internalizing 
external demands, coming to believe that these are their own.  Fromm (1942, p. 162) 
writes ³ZHFDQKDYHWKoughts, feelings, wishes, and even sensual sensations which we 
subjectively feel to be ours, and yet that, although we experience these thoughts and 
feelings, they have been put into us from the outside, are basically alien, and are not 
what we think, feelDQGVRRQ´ For Fromm (1942, p. 218; 1965a, p. 215), modern 
PDQLVDQ³DXWRPDWRQ´GULYHQE\FDSLWDOLVWVRFLHW\WR³consume more and more, and 
for whom everything becomes an article of consumption: cigarettes, liquor, sex, 
movies, television, travel, and even education, books and lectures´ 
 Such accounts of extrinsic motivations as directly introjected can explain 
PXFKRIWKHSDUWLFXODUIRUPRUFRQWHQWRISHRSOH¶VJRDOVDQGPRWLYDWLRQVWhat they 
are less able to account for, however, is why people introject or internalise these 
motivations in the first place.  Fromm (1942) likens this internalisation to the process 
of hypnosis, but such an account would seem to come dangerously close to a socially 
deterministic viewpoint, and contradict the basic humanistic assumption that human 
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beings are active, agentic subjectivities who experience and act towards their world in 
meaningful, choice-making and intelligible ways (Bohart & Tallman, 1999; Cain, 
2002; Laing, 1965). As Rollo May (1990, p. 244) writes in an open letter to Carl 
Rogers (albeit specifically in relation to the problem of evil):  
 
If you conclude that the troubles lies in the fact that human beings are so 
susceptible to influence by their culture, so obedient to orders that they are 
given, so pliable to their environment, then you are making the most 
GHYDVWDWLQJRIDOOMXGJPHQW«LQKXPDQEHLQJV,QVXFKFDVHZHDUHDOOVKHHS
dependent on whoever is the shepherd; and Fred Skinner is right.  
 
From an existential standpoint (e.g., Cooper, 2003), human beings only appear as 
passive recipients of their environmental circumstances when viewed in non-
phenomenological, I-It (Buber, 1958) ways.  Ingleby (1991, p. xlvi) makes this point 
ZKHQKHZULWHV³µ0RGHUQPDQ¶DSSHDUVWR)URPPDVDURERWEXWRQHVXVSHFWVWKDW
WKLVLVEHFDXVHKHKDVQRWJRQHWRWKHWURXEOHRIJHWWLQJWRNQRZKLPZHOOHQRXJK´
,QGHHGKHJRHVRQWRVXJJHVWWKDW)URPP¶V(1991) view of the ³PDQLQWKHVWUHHW´DV
an environmentally-determined automaton represents something of a cultural elitism, 
ZKHUHE\³2QO\WKHFXOWXUHRIKLVRZQFODVV«LVWUXHFXOWXUHWKHUHVWLVVFDWKLQJO\
GLVPLVVHGE\)URPPDVDQµRSLDWH¶´ 
 In fact, Fromm (1942, p. 248), himself, rejects a sociological relativism³LQ
ZKLFKPDQLVQRWKLQJEXWDSXSSHWGLUHFWHGE\WKHVWULQJVRIVRFLDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV´
This suggests, then, that to fully understand the aetiology of extrinsic motivations, it is 
necessary to also consider the active, agentic role that human beings may have in 
coming to act towards these externally-determined goals and standards.  And this 
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includes motivations that are at the moVW³H[WHUQDOO\UHJXODWHG´(Ryan & Deci, 2000) 
end of the self-determination spectrum.  
 
Extrinsic motivations as derived from a non-actualising part of the 
organism 
A humanistic understanding of the aetiology of extrinsic motivations that gives more 
credence to client agency is that some ³SDUW´RIWKHSHUVRQdoes act to internalise and 
introject these drives, but that this part is essentially distinct IURPWKHSHUVRQ¶V
authentic, organismic intents: their actualizing tendency?  This is, effectively, the 
perspective WKDW5RJHUV¶(1959) adopts when, drawing on the work of his student 
Standal (1954), he argues that the need for positive regard is probably a secondary, 
learnt need, based on the infant coming to associate positive regard with other positive 
stimuli, such as being fed and changed.  Along similar lines, Ryan and Deci suggest 
that the person may have drives or desires that are non-actualising: they ZULWH³WKHUH
are many strivings that do not fit the criterion of being essential for well-being and 
PD\LQGHHGEHLQLPLFDOWRLW´(Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 8).   
From a humanistic standpoint, however, such an argument again runs into 
difficulties.  First, at the heart of humanistic psychology is the belief that the organism 
functions as a whole (Bugental, 1964; Maslow, 1987) or, as Rogers (1959) puts it, that 
there is just one basic motive in the human being: the actualizing tendency, which is 
³RSHUDWLYHDWDOOWLPHV´5RJHUVS+HDGGV³7KHUHDUHQRKRPXQFXOLQR
RWKHUVRXUFHVRIHQHUJ\RUDFWLRQLQWKHV\VWHP´(Rogers, 1959, p. 196).  Hence, it 
would seem inconsistent with Rogerian thinking to hypothesize the existence of a 
drive that is separate or disconnected from other organismically-maintaining and 
enhancing forces.  Second, if human beings are hypothesised to act in ways that are 
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fundamentally meaningful and intelligible, it makes little sense to posit the existence 
of a drive that takes people away from what they believe is self-maintaining and self-
enhancing.  Third, the assumption that certain motivations and goals are inherently 
actualizing, while others are inherently non-actualizing or actively inimical to growth, 
would seem to be at odds with an approach that advocates unconditional positive 
regard IRUDOODVSHFWVRIDSHUVRQ¶VH[SHULHQFLQJVHOI(Rogers, 1957); as well as a 
phenomenological commitment to bracketing assumptions and biases (Spinelli, 2005).  
If the aim of a humanistic psychology is to prize the Other in the fullness of their 
otherness (Cooper, 2009; Levinas, 1969), how is it possible to ascribe one set of 
drives as positive and actualizing, and another as pathogenic?  
$IXUWKHUSUREOHPZLWKWKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDW³H[WULQVLF´PRWLYDWLRQVDQGJRDOV
arise from outside of the actualizing tendency is that it necessitates an empirical and 
conceptual distinction EHWZHHQWKH³LQWULQVLF´QHHGIRUDIILOLDWLRQDQGWKH³H[WULQVLF´
need for positive regard and admiration.  Factor analysis has demonstrated the validity 
of this distinction at some level (Grouzet et al., 2005); yet, as Maslow (1943, 1987), 
himself, suggests (see below), the need to be loved and the need to be respected by 
others would seem to be very closely connected.  Some years ago, for instance, I 
worked as a group therapist with a young woman who had experienced very little 
affection as a child, having been brought up in an orphanage, and constantly sought 
the attention and approval of those around her (for reasons of confidentiality, some 
features of this client have been changed).  She would willingly comply with any 
suggestions that emerged from the group, was desperately kind to any other group 
member, and very rarely expressed her own needs for fear of upsetting others.  
Through psychotherapeutic exploration, this client -- and the group -- increasingly 
came to believe that such behaviour was her way of trying to secure the love and 
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attachment (Bowlby, 1969) that she had failed to experience as a child.  Here, her 
desire for love and her desire for approval appeared very closely connected.  
Buber (1988, p. 61) takes this argument one step further when he argues that 
WKHQHHGIRUSXEOLFDFFHSWDQFHLVRQHRIKXPDQEHLQJ¶VPRVWLQWULQVLFDQGH[LVWHQWLDO
needs.  He writes:  
 
The human person needs confirmation because man >VLF@DVPDQQHHGVLW«
Sent forth from the natural domain of species into the hazard of the solitary 
category, surrounded by the air of chaos which came into being with him, 
secretly and bashfully he watches for a Yes which allows him to be and which 
can come to him only from one human person to another.  It is from one man 
to another that the heavenly bread of self-being is passed.  
 
Furthermore, even if it is argued that this desire for positive regard comes from 
somewhere altogether different than the desire for relatedness, it still leaves open the 
question of where, exactly, it comes from.  If it is rooted in an attempt to fulfil some 
other basic need -- such as the desire for autonomy or competence (Ryan & Deci, 
2000) -- WKHQLWLVVWLOOHIIHFWLYHO\DQDWWHPSWWRVDWLVI\VRPH³EDsic and inherent 
SV\FKRORJLFDOQHHGV´(Kasser & Ryan, 1996, p. 280).  Self-determination theorists, 
like Rogers (1959), have suggested that such extrinsic goals and motivations may be 
EDVHGLQ³FRQWLQJHQFLHVRUUHLQIRUFHPHQWV´(Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 10), but 
reinforcements for what?  If they were not, ultimately, associated with -- or directed to 
-- some basic and inherent need, it is difficult to see how they could be sustained, or 
PDLQWDLQVXFKLQIOXHQFHLQDSHUVRQ¶VOLIH5\DQDQG'HFL(2002) also suggest that 
WKH\PD\EH³FRPSHQVDWRU\´IRUPRUHDXWKHQWLFQHHGVEXWDJDLQLIWKH\FRPSHQVDWH
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they must provide the person with some form of needs satisfaction, and it is by no 
means clear what need is being satisfied here, or how it can be construed to be a less 
fundamental and authentic need than others.  Again, if extrinsic motivations and goals 
ZHUHRQO\VDWLVI\LQJ³SHULSKHUDO´QRQ-essential needs, it is difficult to see how they 
FRXOGFRPHWRGRPLQDWHRYHUPRUH³LQWULQVLF´³DXWKHQWLF´GHVLUHV 
 
Extrinsic motivations as derived from intrinsic needs 
Like other members of the humanistic community, Maslow (1968, p. 52) hypothesises 
DSULPDO³IRUNLQWKHURDG´EHWZHHQJURZWK-oriented and approval-oriented 
behaviours.  However, his needs hierarchy (Maslow, 1943, 1987) provides, perhaps, 
the most robust and parsimonious foundations for understanding how extrinsic 
motivations and goals may arise.  For Maslow, human beings have belongingness and 
love needs, and they also have esteem needs, part of which is a desire for ³reputation 
RUSUHVWLJH«VWDWXVIDPHDQGJORU\GRPLQDQFHUHFRJQLWLRQDWWHQWLRQLPSRUWDQFH
dignity or appUHFLDWLRQ´(Maslow, 1987, p. 63).  Consistent with Buber (1988, p. 61), 
but in contrast to Rogers (1951), Maslow does not put these needs for positive regard 
as outside of the principal organismic tendencies.  Rather, for him, they are one, fully-
integrated element of a holistic-dynamic needs structure, as basic as the needs for 
safety or self-actualization.   
 Understood in this ZD\³H[WULQVLF´PRWLYDWLRQVDQGJRDOVFDQEHVHHQDVEHLQJ
ultimately rooted in intrinsic needs and wants.  People may act towards goals that are 
social determined but, ultimately, this is to satisfy personal, internal desires.  Such a 
model overcomes the problem of seeing the person as a passive channel for external 
motives; and it also allows for a view of the human being as integrated, agentic and 
intelligible.   
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However, if extrinsic goals and motivations are understood as being 
intrinsically derived, how can we conceptualize the relationship between different 
wants, and the possible tensions that may emerge between them?  More importantly, 
KRZFDQVXFKDIUDPHZRUNDFFRXQWIRUWKHSDWKRJHQLFHIIHFWRI³H[WULQVLF´ZDQWVDQG
help us understand how people can be facilitated towards greater wellbeing?  
A hierarchical model of human wants 
One potential solution to be developed here is a hierarchical model of human wants 
(see, Cooper, 2000, 2006), of the sort proposed by the highly-influential, and 
³KXPDQLVWLFDOO\-ELDVHG´WKHRULVW, William T. Powers (1973, p. xii).  (Note, the 
hierarchical model proposed here is quite distinct from the Hierarchical Model of 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation proposed by Vallerand & Ratelle, 2002); (as well as 
0DVORZ¶VFODVVLF+LHUDUFK\RI1HHGV0DVORZ).  The term wants is used here to 
refer to those things that we feel a wish or desire for (Cooper, 2006; 
Oxford University Press, 1995), and is adopted to cover the full range of goals and 
intents, from the most micro-OHYHOGHVLUHVIRULQVWDQFH³,ZDQWWRFRPSOHWHWKLV
VHQWHQFH´WRWKHPRVWPDFUR-OHYHOOLIHSURMHFWVIRULQVWDQFH³,ZDQWWRFRQWULEXWH
VRPHWKLQJPHDQLQJIXOE\P\H[LVWHQFH´ 
In this hierarchical model, the most basic human wants -- for instance, to 
PDLQWDLQDQGHQKDQFHRQH¶VEHLQJ(Rogers, 1959); or autonomy, relatedness and 
competence (Ryan & Deci, 2000) -- can be posited to exist at the highest level of a 
motivational hierarchy, with lower order wants established as means of achieving 
consecutively higher order ones.  For instance, I may strive to attain competence by 
trying to be a knowledgeable academic; and one way I may attempt to achieve this is 
by striving to master a new statistical technique; and, to obtain this mastery, I may try 
to clear time from other projects in my life (Figure 1).  Here, numerous wants can be 
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posited to exist at both higher order and lower order levels, with the possibility that 
human beings may strive for a particular higher order want in a multiplicity of ways 
(Austin & Vancouver, 1996).  For instance, as well as trying to achieve competence 
E\EHLQJDQDEOHDFDGHPLF,PD\DOVRWU\WRGRWKLVE\EHLQJD³JRRG´IDWKHUDQG,
PD\VWULYHWRDFKLHYH³JRRGIDWKHUKRRG´E\DLPLQJWRVSHQGPRUHWLPHZLWKP\
children.   
:LWKUHVSHFWWR³LQWULQVLF´DQG³H[WULQVLF´JRDOV and motivations, this 
framework suggests that, rather than being dichotomized, they can be conceptualized 
as existing within a single, unified hierarchical model.  For instance, a person may 
strive to attain relatedness to others through an ³LQWULQVLF´JRDO, such as trying to 
spend more time with close friends (Figure 2).  Alternatively, they may strive to 
DFKLHYHWKLVWKURXJKDQ³H[WULQVLF´JRDOIRULQVWDQFHWKURXJKDFKLHYLQJIDPH+HUH
in this latter case, the hope might be that, through achieving fame, the individual will 
accrue positive regard and respect from others; consequently, others will behave in a 
kinder and more loving manner; and, consequently, there will be more opportunity for 
relatedness.  
 In terms of what determines the particular strategies that individuals may 
adopt to attain their higher order wants, it seems most straightforward to suggest that 
these will be shaped by an individual¶s particular experiences and learning.  A person, 
for instance, who has been through psychotherapy and assertive training, may have 
learnt that the most effective means of experiencing relatedness with others is by 
directly inviting people to engage with them at this level of intimacy.  On the other 
hand, if a person has learnt, perhaps as a child, that directly reaching out for intimacy 
leads to rejection and humiliation, then they may have developed more circuitous 
strategies to get this want met.  For instance, they may have found that affection 
13 
comes only when they behave in a poorly manner, such that they consequently adopt a 
³YLFWLP´UROHWRWU\DQGREWDLQUHODWHGQHVV2USHUKDSVWKURXJKFRQVWDQWexposure to 
reality TV shows like X Factor and $PHULFD¶V*RW7DOHQW, they may have come to 
believe that fame brings with it multiple opportunities for admiration, love and 
intimacy.   
 Hence, within this hierarchy of wants, motivations and goals that have been 
GHHPHG³H[WULQVLF´³SHULSKHUDO´DQG³FRPSHQVDWRU\´(Ryan & Deci, 2002) are re-
conceptualised as intelligible, meaningful attempts by the person to fulfil their most 
EDVLFZDQWVLQWKHEHVWZD\WKDWWKH\NQRZKRZ0RUHRYHUDVZLWK³LQWULQVLF´ZDQWV
they are conceptualized as emerging from the interaction between a person and their 
environment.  However, this is in no way to suggest that both forms of motivations 
and goals are equivalent or, indeed, that they are equally salutogenic -- clearly, as the 
evidence shows (e.g., Kasser & Ryan, 2001, see above), they are not.   
 
Wants and wellbeing 
So how can a hierarchy of wants, in attempting to overcome an intrinsic--extrinsic 
dichotomization, account for the empirically-demonstrated relationship between 
³LQWULQVLF´wants and wellbeing?  A starting point to answer this question is the 
finding that people experience greater psychological wellbeing and positive affect 
when they move towards, and attain, their most fundamental, highest order wants 
(e.g., Brunstein, 1993; Emmons, 1986; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). 
 
Directness.  
In this resSHFWDNH\UHDVRQZK\³LQWULQVLF´ZDQWVPD\EHPRUHVDOXWRJenic than 
³H[WULQVLF´ZDQWVLVEHFDXVHWKH\DUHE\WKHLUYHU\QDWXUHGLUHFWDQGLP-mediate 
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means of satisfying wants and goals (Kasser & Ryan, 1996, 2001).  This compares 
ZLWK³H[WULQVLF´PRWLYDWLRQs and goals which do not provide direct satisfaction in 
WKHPVHOYHVEXWDUHSHUIRUPHGIRUVRPH³VHSDUDEOHRXWFRPH´(Ryan & Deci, 2000, p. 
71), and are highly dependent on ³WKHFRQWLQJHQWUHDFWLRQRIRWKHUV´(Kasser & Ryan, 
1996, p. 286).  For someone to achieve relatedness by being famous (Figure 2), for 
instance, this fame must translate in to positive regard from others, which must then 
translate into genuine desire and affection, which must then lead to closer relatedness.  
And, of course, the person must also achieve fame in the first place.  By contrast, 
approaching others and directly inviting closeness, presuming that the other is 
receptive to this, is much more likely to achieve the desired goal.   
 
Fitted to the context.  
In the example above, and more generally³LQWULQVLF´motivations or goals may also 
be more likely to achieve satisfaction WKDQ³H[WULQVLF´ones because they are more 
suited to, and effectiYHZLWKLQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSDUWLFXODUVRFLR-environmental context.  
If an individual strives to attain relatedness through approaching close friends, for 
instance, there is a good likelihood that this strategy will be successful.  If, however, 
they attempt to do this by striving for fame, they first meet the obstacle that fame is 
only available to a very select few.  Furthermore, even if they did achieve the fame 
that they desire, the assumption that this, then, leads to positive regard from others -- 
and, with it, affection and relatedness -- may well turn out to be wrong.  For instance, 
RWKHUVPD\EHFRPHPRUHMHDORXVRIWKHPIRUWKHLUIDPHRU³XVH´WKHPWRERRVWWKHLU
own sense of self-worth,QWKLVUHVSHFW³intrinsic´ZDQWVE\EHLQJmuch less 
contingent on external factors, may be much more reliable and consistent means of 
DFKLHYLQJRQH¶VJRDOV 
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 In contrast to self-determination and self-concordance theories, however, this 
hierarchy of wants model would predict that, in certain circumstances, people may 
experience greater wellbeing following ³extrinsic´ goals as compared with ³intrinsic´ 
ones.  Say, for instance, an individual is met with genuine cold rejection when they 
H[SUHVVVXFK³LQWULQVLF´GHVLUHVDVWREHFUHDWLYHRUWREHORYHGDQGVD\WKH\ 
experience VRPHGHJUHHRIZDUPWKDQGDIIHFWLRQZKHQWKH\DFWLQ³H[WULQVLFDOO\´
compliant ways.  And, crucially, say that they cannot escape from this context.  Here, 
a hierarchy of wants model would predict that they may, indeed, experience greater 
wellbeing and happiness if they adopt compliant ways of behaving. 
 Such an analysis provides a means of explaining why human beings -- as 
intelligible, meaning-oriented organisms -- may develop ³extrinsic´ motivations and 
goals in the first place, and also KRZWKHVH³H[WULQVLF´VWUDWHJLHVFDQWKHQFRPHWREH
associated with poorer psychological health.  As infants, human beings are often 
brought up in contexts in which basic wants can only be achieved through highly 
circuitous, indirect and externally-mediated routes; and, in which escape is generally 
QRWSRVVLEOH+HQFH³H[WULQVLF´PRWLYDWLRQVDQGJRDOVPD\RIWHQEHWKHPRVW
effective means of achieving the fulfilment of basic, inherent wants.  These strategies 
and learnings can then be carried over into adulthood: the individual continues to 
believe, for instance, that the best way for them to achieve relatedness is through 
DGRSWLQJD³YLFWLP´UROH$VDGXOWVKRZHYHUWKHVHexternal contingencies may no 
longer be in place; moreover, as adults, they now may have much more freedom to 
escape from their environment+HQFHE\VWLFNLQJWRRXWGDWHG³H[WULQVLF´VWUDWHJLHV
for achieving their most basic wants, the individual comes to experience lower levels 
RIZHOOEHLQJWKDQPRUH³LQWULQVLF´VWUDWHJLHVPLJKWDIIRUGWKHP 
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 :LWKLQWKLVKLHUDUFK\RIZDQWVPRGHOKRZHYHUDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VZHOOEHLQJLV
by no means independent of their specific socio-relational context.  Indeed, not only 
GRHVWKLVPRGHOSURYLGHDPHDQVRILQWHJUDWLQJ³H[WULQVLF´DQG³LQWULQVLF´PRWLYDWLRQV
and goals, but it also provides a means of integrating individual and social processes.  
For while psychological difficulties PD\EHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDSRRUILWWHGQHVVWRRQH¶V
context; the model would also predict that a psychological environment in which 
basic human needs cannot be achieved will also lead to higher levels of psychological 
distress -- an association that has been consistently demonstrated in the empirical 
literature (e.g., Brown & Harris, 1978; Layard, 2006; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010).  
 
Synergy and dysergy between goals. 
A hierarchical model of wants suggests a third reason why certain configurations of 
motivations and goals may be more associated with wellbeing than others.  This is, in 
some respects, also UHODWHGWRWKHVDOXWRJHQLFEHQHILWVRIPRUHGLUHFW³LQWULQVLF´
motivations and goals, but broadens this analysis out to a wider understanding of 
psychological wellbeing and change.  The basics of this analysis are that, even if a 
SHUVRQ¶Vwants are direct and fitted to a context, and even if that context has the 
potential to meet their goals and motivations, they may still struggle to progress 
towards their wants -- and, with it, to achieve good psychological health -- if these 
wants are pulling in very different directions.  In the example given in Figure 1, for 
instance, a person may find that their desire to achieve competence by spending more 
time with their children runs into direct conflict with their desire to achieve 
competence by spending more time at work.  Consequently, they may fail to achieve 
either goal and, with it, the sense of competence that they are ultimately striving for.   
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Goal conflicts, intergoal interference (Riediger & Freund, 2004) or dysergies 
between goals (Cooper, 2010), can be hypothesized to exist across similar levels in a 
wants hierarchy, or across very different levels.  With respect to the latter, for 
instance, a person may indirectly attempt to attain relatedness by acting in a very 
submissive manner in a relationship, and this may conflict with their much higher 
order goal of achieving autonomy.  
 The hypothesis that dysergetic relationships between goals is associated with 
psychological difficulties is postulated by Maslow (1971, p. 202), and strongly 
supported by empirical research, which shows that goal conflict is associated with 
lower levels of psychological functioning, affect, mobilization and life satisfaction 
(Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Emmons, 1986; Emmons & King, 1988; Karoly, 1999; 
Riediger, 2007; Riediger & Freund, 2004).  Clinical experience also demonstrates this 
link.  Powers (1973, p. 265) ZULWHV³6LQFHWKHWLPHRI)UHXGDQGQRGRXEWIRUPXFK
longer than that, inner conflicts [between goals] have been recognized as a major 
cause of psychological difficulties.  Unresolved conflict leads to anxiety, depression, 
hostility, unrealistLFIDQWDVLHVDQGHYHQGHOXVLRQVDQGKDOOXFLQDWLRQV´
Concomitantly, intergoal facilitation, horizontal coherence, or synergies (Maslow, 
1971, p. 200) across wants, while less strongly associated with levels of wellbeing, 
does predict the extent to which people actively pursue their goals (Riediger & 
Freund, 2004; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995; Wiese & Salmela-Aro, 2008).   
 To some extent, dysergies may be more likely to emerge if there is a 
SUHGRPLQDQFHRI³H[WULQVLF´JRDOVDQGPRWLYDWLRQVLQDSHUVRQ¶VZDQWVKLHUDUFK\
This is because, if a person is attempting to satisfy their wants through a diversity of 
highly indirect, circuitous and externally-mediated route, there is a good chance that 
some of these will run up against others.  If, on the other hand, a person is aiming to 
18 
satisfy their wants in the most direct ways possible, entanglements may be less likely.  
However, and particularly from a perspective that is more existential than humanistic 
(e.g., van Deurzen, 2002), it may be argued that tensions can exist between even the 
PRVWKLJKHVWOHYHO³LQWULQVLF´ZDQWV$SHUVRQGHVLUHVDXWRQRP\IRULQVWDQFHEXW
they also desire relatedness, and the achievement of one will always, by its very 
nature, compromise the achievement of the other.  Here, conflict between wants is 
posited as a fundamental given of human existence: an aspect of human being that is 
ultimately unsurpassable (Cooper, 2008).  
A more comprehensive and nuanced framework for understanding the 
emergence of dysergetic goal relationships, however, is proposed by Riediger and 
Freund (2004).  They suggest that such conflicts can emerge through two basic routes: 
incompatible goal attainment strategies and resource constraints.  The first of these 
covers the many different forms of conflict that can exist when the way that a person 
attempts to achieve one goal cuts across their strategies for achieving another goal.  
This includes, but is not limited to, the dysergenic (i.e., conflict-generating) effect that 
³H[WULQVLF´JRDOVDQGPRWLYDWLRQVPD\RIWHQKDYHA person who strives to be liked 
by being submissive, for instance, may indeed be attempting to attain relatedness, but 
such a strategy could also be highly incompatible with their desire for autonomy or 
competence, and hence lead to lower levels of psychological wellbeing.  
As Riediger and Freund (2004) suggest, however, dysergetic goal relationship 
may also exist because of limited resources in the social environment.  Cooper (2006, 
p. 88), following similar ideas, writes: 
 
[O]ur wants are often in tension with each other«because we inhabit an 
environment in which the achievement of one want frequently necessitates the 
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subjugation of another. A person in a context of limited financial resources, for 
example, might only be able to achieve their desire for financial security by 
suppressing their desire for excitement and stimulation: for instance, by taking 
a job in a fast food restaurant. Alternatively, in that environment, the person 
may be able to actualise their desire for stimulation by forming a musical 
group with their friends, but then they might have to compromise their desire 
for financial security.  
 
This ³dual PRGHO´XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKRZLQWHUJRDO conflicts may arise -- and, with 
them, psychological distress -- may be a particularly useful framework for developing 
a more politically-aware humanistic model of psychological change.  It suggests that 
improved wellbeing can come about through a reconfiJXUDWLRQRIRQH¶VJRDOVWRZDUGV
a more synergetic arrangement -- essentially, the process of therapy (Cooper, 2006; 
Mansell, 2005) -- but it also suggests that improved wellbeing can come about 
through real social change: through the creation of social environments in which the 
achievement of one goal does not necessitate the subjugation of others.  And this 
requires the creation of synergetic cultures (Maslow, 1971): in which the way in 
which one person achieves their wants facilitates, rather than undermines, the want-
attainment of others.  
 
Conclusion.  
The aim of this paper has been to develop a humanistic understanding of 
psychological wellbeing and change that overcomes a number of conceptual, political 
and, ultimately, ethical difficulties associated with the positing of a strict intrinsic--
extrinsic dichotomy. 
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This model can be summarised as follows: psychological wellbeing is 
associated with the extent to which we progress towards, and attain, our deepest, most 
fundamental wants: for instance, relatedness, autonomy and esteem.  As intelligible, 
meaning-orientated human beings, we always work towards achieving such wants, but 
the way we do so will be heavily influenced by our experience and perceptions of 
what are successful and unsuccessful means of doing so.  If the strategies that we have 
developed become unsuited to our present context -- being less direct and more 
dysergetic than they need to be -- we will experience lower levels of psychological 
wellbeing than it is possible for us to attain.  However, the extent to which we can 
experience psychological wellbeing will be heavily dependent on our environments, 
and the extent to which they require us to forego the attainment of one goal by the 
achievement of another.  
 Within this general conceptual framework, psychological motivations and 
JRDOVWKDWKDYHEHHQWHUPHG³LQWULQVLF´ZLOOWHQGWREHPRUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKZHOOEHLQJ
WKDQWKRVHWHUPHG³H[WULQVLF´7KLVLVQRWEHFDXVHWKH\DUHGHULYHGIURPa different 
source to ³extrinsic´ goals and motivations, but because they are more direct and im-
mediate means of satisfying our most fundamental, highest order wants.  As such, 
they are also most likely to be effective at attaining our highest order wants within a 
particular socio-relational context, and the ones that are least likely to conflict with 
other higher and lower order goals.   
 The hierarchy of wants developed in this paper outlines a means of 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJERWK³LQWULQVLF´DQG³H[WULQVLF´JRDOVDQGPRWLYDWLRQVZLWKLQDXQLILHG
conceptual framework.  It avoids judging or disPLVVLQJ³H[WULQVLF´ZDQWVE\
construing them as intelligible -- albeit often inefficient or ineffective -- means of 
attaining the highest order goals.  In this respect, it retains an image of the human 
21 
being as an active, meaning-seeking organism that, in whatever circumstance, strives 
to do its best.   
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Figure 1. A hierarchy of wants 
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